The Condition: Globalization

Globalization is not a process, but a “condition,” writes Yergin and Stanislaw (p. 215).  They explain that it is creating changes that are happening very quickly and creating a situation where international firms, and other players, can really thrive.  At first glace, the term “condition” reminds me of a sickness, something out of the ordinary and that needs to be fixed.  Brown would agree that there are many negative consequences of this “condition.”  Population increases, increases in the global middle class, meat consumption, and climate change are all impacting the Earth’s sustainability and food security. 

Government privatization is the “greatest sale in the history of the world,” (Yergin and Stanislaw, 214) but why are they for sale?  Yergin and Stanislaw state how governments have less money now and also how people have lost faith in them. Governments are known to do functions more efficiently than private firms.  But, protecting the welfare and safety of its citizens is not always profitable and efficient.  In my housing policy class, we discussed how community development centers (CDCs) had often had a dual mission: to build low-income housing and to help give low-income employees of the CDCs skills to move on to do bigger things (Hyra).  It’s very difficult (and expensive) to measure the efficiency of providing human capital. In class, we talked about how we grew up learning the rosy stories of our nation’s history, then learned more and more about the complexities and how it was over-simplified.  And then, often, people are “jaded,” feeling lied to by the government and people just choose not to participate in making any changes since they feel insignificant.

Why do nations still continue to try to hold legitimacy?  What does nationalism even mean for us anymore?  These readings really emphasize the meaningless function of national borders and countries, but I think there are still some important functions for nations, including national security.  And for social cohesion, we often think it best for people to assimilate to one unified culture.  I found Johnson’s discussion on monument building interesting, especially when Johnson uncovered the politics and conflicts involved with planning monuments when discussing the planning of and the selection of an architect for the Vietnam Wall.  (Fun fact: Maya Lin also designed the wave field on the Unviersity of Michigan’s engineering campus). 

Yergin and Stanislaw ask if “these changes are irreversible,” referring to the world economy’s turn toward global capitalism (p. 212).  Ohmae would say that regional economies would be a better solution.  And how do they all suspect that we would be able to make these changes to the current system: through technology. That may be generally, true, but information technology access can be limited depending on the country, rural vs. urban, and by gender.  The Internet is still not “free” for everyone.  And as talked about in class, what happens when our information is retrieved from a TNC who controls much of the U.S. media, such as Comcast who now owns NBCUniversal (how about that for a name of a media giant?).  Our news will contain limited information, skewed based on whatever the highest bidder wants us to read.

Something that may support regional economies is if there were similar languages and cultures.  We talked in class how rather than ethnic identities, many Americans have regional identities.  And language variations certainly are related to that, as Johnson describes it as an important factor.  There are also linguistic differences that separate “imagined communities” of different classes that was not discussed in Johnson’s article.  What’s interesting to me, is how our nation’s identity will change once we are a “majority-minority” nation and when Spanish is the most common native language. 

Nation-states in a global capitalist economy

The authors from this week’s readings debate the role of nation-states in a global economy and express a range of views that reflect the divergent threads of globalization theory.

In The Commanding Heights (2002), Yergin and Stanlislaw celebrate the “new consensus” of globalism and the power of private capital to drive growth and progress in developed and developing countries. They believe that the increasingly integrated financial market system has replaced the former function of government as the holder of public trust and responsible for improving quality of life. Given the economic disaster perpetrated by the financial industry in the Great Recession, I think they oversell the role of public trust in terms of the decline of the nation state as a viable economic unit.

Ohmae, in The End of the Nation State, would agree with Yergin and Stanislaw that national governments are on the decline, but goes a bit further in describing just how irrelevant nation-states are. Yergin and Stanlislaw identified increasing deficits and the expansion of welfare as two reasons why modern governments struggled to provide the same level of service. Ohmae is equally dismissive of federal handouts and points out the absurdity of the nation-state as an economic entity. Countries like India and China have very different means of production and very different needs. Physical geography still matters – both in terms of capabilities but also profit maximization (think supply chains). What doesn’t matter as much, in terms of participating in the global economy, is cultural identity. Here Ohmae distinguishes himself from Huntington, author of The Clash of Civilizations. Like Yergin and Stanlislaw, Ohmae sees technology and the sharing of information across cultures as a way to counter the cultural tensions that arise, but he makes a comparison I don’t agree with – that the spread of information, technology and consumer goods will translate to shared prosperity. In his words, “citizens of a global marketplace will not wait passively” for improved standards of living, and believes the global “centripetal force” will not allow private elites to control information. Information and prosperity are not unconnected, but not wholly correlated either. Corporations use technology to track consumer spending patterns and sell more goods. This is not necessarily evil, but it does demonstrate that citizens don’t have full access to the same information or technology that corporations/elites have. Likewise, citizens can’t always rise up and demand a higher quality of life without being tracked or held in check by governments that track their behaviors and beliefs. Brown’s reporting on global food shortages likewise illustrates how governments are susceptible to corruption and willing to hurt their own people in order to enrich themselves. It takes more than information to guarantee more equitable prosperity.

Johnson’s The Renaissance of Nationalism runs directly counter to Ohmae, Yergin and Stanlislaw. Johnson takes the opposite view of Ohmae in arguing that national culture is the link and the framework through which individuals interpret local and global events. Nation-states promote cultural and territorial unity by using the media and the educational system to promulgate “imagined communities.” I think that Johnson correctly describes the role of centralized government in forming common cultural identities and is also probably right in claiming that the end of the nation state is not imminent. Cultural identity still matters, and I would imagine that the world would be in an uproar if G-20 nations decided to redraw political boundaries to align with the boundaries of global cities and “the rest”. However, this conclusion is implied and not stated by Johnson, and I think she didn’t adequately address economic arguments against nation-states.

I was glad to see that unlike the other authors, Brown called attention to some very real pressures on capitalism, including population growth and rising levels of consumption across the world. Furthermore, rising temperatures, water supplies, soil quality and diminishing returns from agricultural technology will likely increase conflict and limit the centripetal forces that Ohmae and others believe will lead to increased prosperity for all.

The Nation State – Economically Irrelevant, Culturally Significant

The focus of this week’s readings on the aspects of political globalization left me with mixed feeling concerning the future of the nation state. With the advent of institutions such as the European Union and the United Nations, the idea that the nation-states were to become irrelevant is not a new one. However, I do not completely agree with the sentiment that nations will become nothing more than a relic of a past era, at least not in the foreseeable future. Although I do agree with the sentiments that nations will no longer play the economic role they did for much of the 20^th century, I feel that their role will become increasingly important as a cultural institution.

As mentioned, the role that states have played economically will continue to diminish as transnational economies continue to emerge and develop. Ohmae first present this argument in his piece The End of the Nation State where he states that we now live in a world where capital and investment are very mobile. No longer tied to particular nations, the products and services marketed to consumers globally, as well as the firms that produce them, can no longer claim to have a singular national origin. Additionally, with the help of improved technology, consumers now have access to quality products that are not produced “at home.” Finally, as part of this increased economic mobility, state that seek to protect their economic sovereignty risk global diversion of investment to other more attractive states or regions.

Yergin and Stanislaw further this argument with their point that states have begun to lessen their control and management of various economies by giving the “commanding heights” – those elements of the economy most central to its operation – back to private markets. This new reality for nation-states becomes all too real with the discussion of the coming scarcity of food. Brown reports that, due to factors such as continued population growth, environmental instability in terms of weather and availability of water, the use of food as fuel, and global adoption of animal based diets; that we have reached a peak of sorts in food production. What’s different about this situation is that instead of states looking for ways to regulate and manage these market issues, they have instead relied on the markets via the purchasing of land and food for their citizens in developing regions.

However, with all of this said, I do feel that states will continue to be important actors culturally. Although they may be more less relevant economically, state can and will continue “nation building” process such as educational experiences and the marking of historical figures and events thorough statues and monuments much like we see in the DC region. However, because the diminished economic importance of nations, I feel that these processes will begin to fall along cultural lines rather than as a means of preserving the nation state units observed during the rise of capitalism. I feel that we will see more tension in places with histories and cultures at opposition with the overarching state such as the province of Quebec in Canada or the Basque regions of Spain where there exist linguistic and cultural traditions that are viewed as separate from the greater nation.

Globalization and the resulting social exclusion in cities

Moving forward from our discussions of broad world systems and how globalization works worldwide, Knox presents more insights on world cities’s within the context of globalization. Several aspects of geoeconomic and geopolitical change have caused some economic decentralization, but centeredness is still important in our world economy (Knox).  World cities are needed for their authority, sociability, and innovation, says Knox.  World cities act as “cotter pins” that hold together the global hierarchy of the core, semi-periphery, and periphery (p. 239). Knox includes a hierarchy of cities, and New York, London, Tokoyo, and Paris stand out as having a full-range of world-city functions.

According to Harvey, there has been an increasing trend to not care about improving cities as a whole, since capital is not location-dependent.  The marginalization of the poor is a result of people retracting investment and interest in cities, often leaving inner cities with a concentration of low-income families with few opportunities. But there is reason to actually be concerned about the “blasé indifference” about the marginalization of the poor that Harvey mentions.  Davis actually predicted an uprising in an LA neighborhood.  Harvey expresses that cities are still important and that we need to understand the relationship between process and form.  He argues that processes shape cities more so than actual form, and that the processes that build cities are ecological processes.  His definition of “ecology” seems to be a mix of social processes (as in sociology from the Chicago School) and environmental ecology.  He’s right about urban ecology not being considered until very recently.  I’m currently in an urban ecology course and found this image to be helpful in understanding the built environment.

(Source: http://non-fiction.eu/projects/4971-2/)

Rather than focusing on processes, Davis is more concerned about urban form affecting social exclusion, as spatial segregation of the poor versus the very wealthy is increasing in Los Angeles.  He critiques the government (in L.A. and other cities) playing its role in the spatial segregation through the destruction of public spaces and sidewalks by allowing large block developments, removing access corridors, barricading/patrolling neighborhoods in the name of “crime prevention,” and promoting more exclusive private space (malls instead of main streets). 

Similarly, Madanipour recognizes the importance of viewing spatial exclusion with social exclusion.  He is especially concerned where places (neighborhoods) experience a higher degree of social exclusion through economic, political, and cultural arenas.  And Madanipour stresses that there is not only economic means for social exclusion.  He points out how there is a bit of a conundrum: do we emphasize eliminating differences that separate people or emphasize those differences, each can have negative consequences.  There must be a way to understand differences and try to incorporate non-mainstream preferences and needs into the planning process.

I would argue somewhat with Harvey and Davis, though, that there is a “back-to-the-city” movement where many people are paying a lot more attention to urban form, amenities, and improving the city as a whole.  What still exists is the spatial separation of those that are economically well-off and those that are not.  And many families with young children in cities choose to not send their kids to public schools, leaving inner city schools education systems with less resources and perpetuates crime and poverty within inner cities. 

Week 5: Global and local economic forces of globalization

This week’s readings identified some of the broad economic forces involved with globalization but also highlighted the importance of localized factors, like physical geography and low-wage/non-union political climates that influence the flow of resources between rich and poor nations.

In the 2005 article, Can Extreme Poverty Be Eliminated?, Sachs takes a relatively sunny view of globalization. He argues that in the arc of human history and especially since the Industrial Revolution, globalization has lifted the majority of the world’s population out of poverty. For nations stuck in a poverty trap, physical geography matters – and this includes factors such as rainfall and water supply, whether an area is landlocked and isolated from other markets and transport lines, and the persistence of disease. Investors are scared away by such factors, and poor regions thus lack the financial resources to invest in building human capital and critical infrastructure.

As I read Sachs’ article, I imagined a potential defense of globalization: is it better that everyone was poor and more equal (pre-industrial revolution) or many more people are richer and more comfortable, but with more worldwide inequality? This is along the lines of a globalization defense I’ve heard before (from an economist friend while at an otherwise perfectly pleasant dinner party), and I generally think it evades the fairness question inherent in the global trends today.

In contrast to Sachs, Robert Wade showed that global inequality is unquestionably and quickly increasing. Wade argues that poverty and inequality is more than just a trap – it’s that the poorer countries are increasingly unable to participate in international trade. As rich nations (mainly OECD countries) get richer, their exported goods and services become too expensive for poorer nations. Wade also cites multiple studies using different methods to show how the global income distribution is becoming more unequal. Wade’s “zones of peace” and “zones of turmoil” evoke Barber’s Jihad v. McWorld dichotomy as well as Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis. Interestingly, Wade believes that the dissemination of technology exacerbates the tension that arises from the increasing gap between rich and poor, as poor people “find their access to basic necessities restricted at the same time as they see people on television driving Mercedes cars.” Many other authors have cited technology as a force that lifts people out of poverty, but Wade implies a distinction between consumptive technology (smartphones, TV) and technology that improves a person’s means of production.

Barff’s chapter ponders the spatial consequences of globalization and the future of multinational corporations (MNCs). In explaining the new international division of labor (NIDL), he echoes Wallerstein but fails to describe it as the glue holding together the structure of the capitalist world economy. Rather, Barff opts for a more utilitarian description of globalization’s drivers, which involve MNCs seeking ownership-specific advantages and location-specific advantages. Ownership-specific factors are essentially the institutional resources possessed by MNCs – their ability to gain access to markets because they can borrow large sums of money and invest in technology. MNCs also take advantage of location-specific factors, which is Barff’s way of saying MNCs seek political and economic conditions that foster low-wage, non-unionized labor – key to his NIDL theory. More so than the other authors from this week and semester, Barff identifies how thoroughly the division of labor has permeated production processes. Tasks requiring knowledge or independent activity have been removed from the production process, meaning that producers can save on labor costs by plugging in unskilled workers to complete simplified tasks.

Through the example of core and periphery relationships in Southeast Asia and the production of tennis shoes in Lumberton, NC, Barff also shows how the geography of the NIDL is not always global and isn’t always about offshoring to third world economic processing zones. By the end of the article, Barff seems to be arguing globalization isn’t as unequal as we think and that we shouldn’t be focusing on the labor exploitation, since MNCs occupy a global geographic space for multiple reasons, including access to markets and resources.

While I realize there’s only so much space in a Scientific American magazine, I think Sachs failed to fully address the difficulty in planning, implementing and monitoring more targeted versions of foreign aid. I agree that more targeted aid that would address basic problems would be better than development plans foisted onto poor countries by the IMF or World Bank, but who would design and carry out such plans, and how would we know that they aren’t corrupt or placing their interests above the recipient nation’s needs?

Week 5: Poverty or Subservience?

This week’s readings centered mostly on the issues of global poverty and the experiences associated with in light of globalization. Overall, I think the most salient dynamic I observed was the choice that developing nations have between perpetual poverty or western subjugation. Robert Wade begins this conversation with his article detailing the massive increases in poverty as the planet has continued to globalize its markets. Wade finds that through looking at GINI index measures that globally inequality had grown dramatically over the course of a few years and that the share of income going to the world’s poor was shrinking while simultaneously wealthy populations were seeing their incomes grow. Additionally, the poor are marginalized when talking into account the fact that the prices of goods from wealthy developed countries have continued to rise much faster than those originating in poor developing nations.

Wade comments in the article on his observation of global development organization such as the World Bank and the IMF and their views on global inequality. In his opinion, these organizations are largely unaware of the continued impoverishment of the developing world and that, more disturbingly, are apathetic on the issue of inequality. However, as shocked as he is about the lack of concern expressed by these organizations, what he fails to realize is that relieving global poverty and inequality is not mission of these organizations. This links back to the arguments made last week by Stiglitz and Pilger. Global development organization do not operate in the interest of reducing inequality but instead seek to create attractive business climate for predominately western business interests. When examined in that light, it becomes clear how the perpetual poverty of poor nations can be attractive to MNC actors always looking for ways in which to cut their (labor and raw materials) costs and ultimately profit as much as possible.

Shifting gears, Jeffrey Sachs develops strategies for relieving this ever-increasing global poverty. Specifically, he makes the statement that poverty does not stem from government corruption, as is often insinuated by the development community, but instead has its roots in lacking government services and support, disease, and relative isolation from the rest of the world. In his opinion, we as a global society now possess the means to overcome these issues and, via technology, can eliminate the disease of poverty as we have with other conditions such as polio and small pox. From here, Sachs lays out strategies, methods, and the monetary costs needed in order to achieve this goal. In looking at his proposals though, I become torn. On the one hand, I feel that poverty is never an acceptable condition and that we should utilize whatever means available to us to eliminate it. On the other hand however, I feel that these types of approaches leave developing nations little room for autonomy and self-determination for reason identified in the piece written by David Slater. Slater discussed how historically development has been thought about in developed spaces. He argues that, in most cases, the west is held as the global standard to which developing nations are examined. To be considered developed and modern means to uphold and mimic western traditions, business pattern, and ways of living without questioning the ways in which the west is flawed (environmental degradation, waste, sexism, etc.).  When thought about in this light then, it would seem that whether a developing nation is poor or own its way to prosperity via investment, its has no say in whether or not it will obedient to western interests and norms.

Week 5: How to relieve extreme poverty?

Wade (2001) brings up the issue how many people are still focused on how to measure global inequity or poverty rather than seriously discussing how to handle it.  There is a debate on whether to use purchasing-power parity (PPP) or actual monetary exchange rates.  Regardless of how we measure it, income inequality exists and there may be real negative consequences for the wealthier countries.  Such as weakened political stability in countries with high unemployment and the ability to organize around it through technology.

An interesting question was asked by Wade (2001): why does most opposition to globalization come from North America, Western Europe, and Oceania (the wealthier nations benefiting from it) rather than elites from developing countries?  I think we’ve explored this issue before in class.  Developing countries are somewhat left without a choice other than to get some monetary help to help their citizens, but are then in a cycle of debt repayment and have to subscribe to the conditions of the loans.

One of the major theories supporting the need for continued development and incorporation into the capitalist society is the Modernization Theory (Slater).  It was interesting to read Slater’s analysis of how the idea of “universal applicability of the modernizing imperative” was starting to decline in the 1970s as people realized that societies in the developing world could be more heterogeneous than originally thought.  It’s amazing that this theory did not experience much critique beyond the 1980s.

A prevailing point throughout the readings: geography has a lot to do with how successful a country is in taking advantage of a world economy.

• The United States was put into a great position after World War II since they were able to make a lot of foreign direct investments in Europe after they removed some restrictions for doing so in order to rebuild after the war (Barff).  The United States was not affected with much physical destruction due to their geographical location away from the war.
• The fertile floodplains in Southeastern Asia helped propel countries profit from them, especially after the green revolution (Sachs and Barff).
• Several factors limited Africa’s development including disease that occurs in tropical areas, such as Malaria (Sachs).   Interior Africa suffers from lack of access to ports, making it undesirable for FDI (Sachs).

In addition to geography, there a few other reasons for extreme poverty according to public opinion in affluent countries over the years (Sachs): race, poor governance, religion, caste systems, a lack of entrepreneurship, and gender inequities.  Poor governance (corruption) is now the prevailing understanding of why countries still have extreme poverty.  Part of Sach’s “plan” is to closely watch over the donations of increased federal aid to ensure they are correctly distributed to those truly in need.  This sounds like a great idea, but wouldn’t further monitoring put wealthy nations further into the business of developing nations?  Further dictating on what they think is important to spend money on?  I think this idea is worth developing some more.  I agree with Sachs that financial assistance to counteract poverty should be doubled, but rather than targeting affluent nations, we should target the transnational capitalist class and transnational corporations.

Week 3: Conflicting Ideas on the Global Future

What stood out to me the most about this week’s readings were the opinions and ideas expressed and how they conflicted with not only each other but also with how I personally view the processes of globalization. This dynamic ultimately begins with the conflicting ideas presented in the articles by Huntington and Barber. Huntington looks to globalization and predicts that the world’s future conflicts no longer take place between nation states or economic interests but will evolve into conflicts between global civilized societies. He argues that because of factors such as increased contact between civilizations as well as increasing economic regionalism, we can expect to see more intense conflict and violence happen between actors of differing civilizations. However, an important factor that I feel is missing from His observations is the presence of global capitalism and the effects that it has had on our societies.

What I feel is forgotten in Huntington’s critique is that the goal of global capitalism is to create as much profit for those working within it as possible. As was mentioned in last week’s readings, at the global level this means locating the cheapest labor and resources possible and placing your products in as many markets as possible. Therefore, for conflict to exist between whole cultures would not make sense. Minus the sale of arms, global markets would not favor a situation in which whole cultures are at war with one another because of the interdependence present within the global system. Our markets are specialized to the point at which even whole groups of nations cannot survive without the goods and services provided from other cultures. Even at the level of the city this theory begins to fall apart when the fact that global cities have become agglomerations of people from every civilizations is made. Because capitalism requires that our markets continue to expand, clashing civilizations are not helpful in continuing this dynamic. This is not to say that globalism means that all conflict will be eliminated but to highlight that I do not see our planet delving into massive conflicts based upon cultural heritages.

In my opinion, Barber does a better job of describing what the future will hold for our societies under globalism. In his article he describes a world in which two forces are at work. “McWorld” represents the appearance of a homogeneous global society that is brought together through the use of “technology, commerce, and resources” to the benefit of multinational corporations, common markets, and transnational actors. “Jihad” on the other had represents the rebirth of nationalist sentiments and struggle not for causes such as economic resources or human rights but for the sake of expressing identity. What is unique about these two forces is that both are not proponents of strong democracy but instead move away from it. Barber more accurately describes the present situation in that although their may be actors who will seek to move away from the creation of global society and culture, the McWorld concept presented by global capitalism is present and will only continue to bring the planet closer and closer together.

Week 3: Interpreting globalization

The authors from this week’s readings demonstrated how interpretations of globalization can vary depending on one’s cultural, political and economic values.

The benefits of globalization

Several authors highlighted the tremendous benefits of globalization. According to Amartya Sen, globalization is neither Western in origin or disguised as imperialism, and that global poverty has been beaten back as modern technology has flourished. Despite the recognized benefits, Sen says that we should be asking not whether the rising tide of globalization lifts all boats, but asking whether the poor receive their fair share. He proposes that we reexamine political and economic policies, and in particular, global institutional arrangements, to ensure that poorer countries receive aid that gives them the opportunity to grow, develop and participate in the global marketplace.

Micklethwait and Wooldridge propose that globalization “increases efficiency and thus prosperity” and also increases individual freedom and choice. They also believe that because of globalization, the balance of power is trending toward individuals rather than governments. Stiglitz also recognizes that the proliferation of knowledge has improved public health, life expectancies, though the rest of his piece highlights the growing worldwide inequality.

Culture and ideology matter

Barber and Huntington recognize that culture and ideology are important factors that will affect how the globalization movement proceeds. Barber illustrates how globalization encourages a measure of peace and stability as well as the proliferation of commonality in markets, language and behavior. Technology provides the means of disseminating dominant cultural norms throughout the modernized world that encourage participation in the global marketplace.

However, the push toward globalization, or the McWorld, as he puts it, is meeting resistance from societies that hope to preserve cultural identities through isolationist or divisive attitudes and activities, including violence. Lines are drawn according to ethnic, cultural, or religious boundaries. Ultimately, Barber thinks that the tribal Jihadist worldview will succumb to the global economic incentives, and that confederations may be the ideal form of governance for nation-states, as they provide low-level democratic self-determination and high-level representation.

In The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington claims that future conflicts will be based on cultural differences. Like Barber, Huntington points to religion as being a catalyst for conflict and a way for cultures to continue holding onto their identities in the face of worldwide cultural homogenization.  However, while The Clash of Civilizations is a powerful argument, I think Huntington overreaches in trying to parse the cultural forces from economic and political forces that also drive globalization. I would argue that civilizations are organized around cultural values, healthy economic exchanges, and self-defense, and that all are incredibly intertwined.

Both authors also contradict Sen’s assertion that globalization is not equivalent to Westernization. Huntington believes that societies have three choices:  to join the West, pursue isolationist policies, or increase their economic and military power to balance against Western power.

Disturbing trends for democracy and social justice

Barber and Stiglitz highlight the pitfalls of globalization, particularly in terms of democracy and social justice. Barber argues that globalization is oriented to economic prosperity and that the role of government is to encourage the productivity and efficiency of the markets. As he notes, participation in democracy is simply not needed or even wanted. I wonder if voter ID laws that seem to restrict access to the polls is an echo of this viewpoint? Or even low voter turnout – do we, as voters, know that there is no real choice in the post-Citizens United world? Mickelwaith and Woolridge inadvertently evoke the more limited democartic options in a globalized world, as we now have increased freedoms to buy the products we need to fully express ourselves, rather than having a more robust political system.

 

Week 3: Weighing the Pros and Cons of Globalization

Will globalization cause the world to continue to make more people better off or end the world in a battle against civilizations?  This week’s readings weigh globalization’s positives and negatives offering theories that help clarify what this movement really is.

Barber and Huntington both theorize about the future outcomes for our world.  Barber (1992) suggests that there will be one of two outcomes: a brutal fight against peoples (jihad) or a blanket of uniformity (McWord).  A year later, Huntington (1993) declares that the end of history will most certainly be the former, a clash of civilizations over cultural lines.  Those bound by a common language, history, religion, customs, and institutions will band together against those different from themselves.  I don’t know what would be worse, this “jihad” between cultures or one uniform culture.  Let’s say that there is a cultural conflict between people, would it necessarily have to be the “end of history” or, perhaps, would the dominant culture become pervasive in all other civilizations, still resulting in one uniform result?

Stiglitz’s (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents is a powerful cry against the adverse impacts caused by globalization.  He argues that problems did not result from globalization itself, but with how it has been managed.  Emerging economies (i.e. East Asian countries) that were in a position to determine their own pace of change and had control over the distribution of benefits within their countries faired better than those who started off at more of a disadvantage and had to participate with rules of engagement dictated by the leading players in the global market.  Expectations for those countries with loans from the IMF were unfair and unrealistic to actually create economic growth.  And poorer countries who would usually have a comparative advantages in exporting produce were excluded from the market as European and American produce was artificially “cheaper” through subsidies.  Clearly, the international financial decision-makers are not trying to create the most economic growth for the whole world, but are interested in keeping those with the capital acquiring more and more of their share.

Similarly, Sen’s (2002) “How to Judge Globalism” believes that globalization itself is not the problem, but there needs to be institutional reform to have a more equitable sharing of benefits, but says so in a more positive light than Stiglitz.  Sen’s article also clarifies that globalization is NOT a new Western ideal.  And it is NOT a feature of imperialism, since it has roots from various cultures, including the Chinese printing the first book.

Micklethwait and Woolridge (2000) recognize some minor pitfalls from globalization, but believe that the world is benefiting overall.  They defend globalization and claim that critics of globalization are usually able to point to concentrated places of “losers,” but the “winners” far outweigh them and are scattered across the globe.

One thought I had while reading this was whether or not a system of subsidence and local trading could occur globally, if we were somehow able to trash global capitalism.  Would people be better off?  Or would there still be some winners and losers?  I’m an environmentalist and care about consuming local goods so that they travel fewer miles, but I suppose if this was widespread more people would suffer not having access to things that could improve their lives (i.e. health care innovations, foreign investment, etc.).